

Why public integrity fails **“The fault...is not in our stars, but in ourselves...”¹**

Stuart H. Brody
SUNY New Paltz

ABSTRACT

The ethical breaches of government officials and business leaders are not simply the product of temptations to which they succumb in those positions, but rather the culmination of commonplace failures of integrity that they, like most people, commit on a daily basis, and which tend to pass unnoticed, unexamined and uncorrected. These traps can be observed in three principal ways: 1. People commonly cling to their beliefs and opinions—making life-altering decisions affecting themselves and others—with little or no factual support for such beliefs and opinions. 2. They insist on the purity of their intentions, blinding them to the unethical nature of their actions. 3. They tend to view integrity’s requirements through a distorting lens that justifies self-interest: for instance, creating self-promoting categories of false duties such as the duty to survive or loyalty to self, and viewing integrity as an uncompromising stand of personal conviction rather than the deliberate accommodation of competing interests. As a consequence of these defects in discernment, most remain blind to their own breaches, even as they judge the breaches of others. The paper challenges the assumption that the practice of integrity is an innate skill and asserts that it is a methodology that must be systematically deployed to be effective. The paper lays out the tenets of this methodology.

Keywords: integrity, duty, ethics, ethics training, integrity training

Acknowledgement: The author wants to expressly acknowledge Dr. Chih-Yang Tsai, Professor and Associate Dean of the Business School of SUNY New Paltz, for his contributions to this study.

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¹ Shakespeare, W, Julius Caesar.

INTRODUCTION

Do you lack integrity? Of course not. Few people think they do.

Everyone is certain he or she possess integrity, defined generally herein as the ability to discern the correct ethical course and to act accordingly: to do the right thing. Everyone believes that his or her moral compass points true.

Yet, every day the media features accounts of spectacular breaches of integrity: political stalemates, business corruption, media exploitation, greed in sports, manipulation of academic data, sexual misconduct of church clergy, and so forth.

In the face of such events, it is natural to ask why persons of responsibility within these institutions seek personal advantage at the expense of the trust placed in them.

It is generally assumed that something occurs in the process of exercising power that results in greater vulnerability to ethical missteps: either some latent flaw in character manifests itself, or, to express it in a different way, temptation tends to turn a good person bad.

Since most people believe they possess integrity, they assume that they would not engage in such breaches, and that those who do are morally defective. In making such judgments about the integrity of others, they posture themselves as not only certain of their own integrity but expert in identifying the defects of others (Fiske, 2004).

The reality is likely more complicated. Leaders within public institutions do not suddenly go bad. Rather, their actions are the visible culmination of commonplace failures of integrity that they—like most people—have been committing regularly, just less publicly (Bazerman & Banaji, 2004).

This paper will examine three areas of common breaches that tend to pass unnoticed, unexamined and uncorrected.

1. Clinging to beliefs and opinions, and making life-altering decisions based on them, with little or no factual support.
2. Insisting on the purity of one's intention, while disregarding the unethical nature of one's actions.
3. Treating self-interest as a duty, thus transforming what one wants into something one deserves.

Over the past half century, research into pre-cognitive processes has questioned whether conscious deliberation is the predominant basis of moral decision-making. Gordon Allport's pioneering work on the nature of bias revealed that unconscious processes overrode cognitive ones in ways unknown to the conscious mind (Allport, 1954). Wegner (1979) demonstrated that human beings claim not only responsibility for actions over which they had no control, tending to attribute their actions to premeditated intention, and discounting unconscious process. The concept of "automaticity" evolved to explain how people spontaneously and unconsciously categorize, stereotype, and judge, then believe these reactions to be the product of cognition (Fiske, 2004).

Subsequent recent research has shown that these "automatic processes" exert a more decisive influence in decision-making than "controlled processing" (Moore & Lowenstein, 2005). Since automatic processing occurs outside of conscious awareness, its influence on judgment and decision-making is difficult to eliminate or correct. As a result, self-interest can prevail even when the decision-maker is certain that more cognitively pure or manifestly objective factors are controlling (Bazerman & Banaji, 2004).

This research demonstrates that in a wide variety of situations, the conscious mind denies precisely what the unconscious mind compels. Accordingly, ethical breaches are not necessarily the result of one's choosing self-interest over the right thing--what is commonly termed corruption--but rather such breaches occur because self-interest masquerades as the right thing. It is served up to the cognitive mind by unconscious and "automatic processes" as morally sound (Bazerman & Banaji, 2004).

Herbert Simon (1984), created the term "human bounded ethicality" to encompass the operation of biases that are not simply the result of intentional dishonesty but rather of "insidious" processes that limit the rational power of the mind. "In the bounded ethicality model, the self processes work, unconsciously, to protect a particular view and this view bounds ethical decision making. Ethical decisions are biased by a stubborn view of oneself as moral, competent and deserving and thus, not susceptible to conflicts of interest." (Clugh, Bazerman & Banaji, 2005, p. 80)

This self-view of morality enables the decision-maker to believe he resists temptation for unfair gain even as he succumbs to it. The view of self as moral assures that whatever one does stems from a motivation the self assumes is just; the self-view of competence asserts that the decision-maker qualifies for the role at hand even as he lacks essential qualifications; and, the self-view of deservingness assumes that one's advantages arise from merit rather than other factors such as luck or patronage over which he had no influence.

The particular form of self-deception which allows the belief that one is acting morally while behaving self-interestly is called "ethical fading"; that is, moral implications are obscured or "fade" into the background (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). The process is facilitated by a number of strategies, not consciously pursued, but routinely deployed in social interaction to ensure the debilitation of the moral voice. Tenbrunsel and Messick identified four processes by which this fading is accomplished: 1. the use of euphemism, 2. "slippery slope" decision-making, which refers to making small ethical breaches at first, then committing bigger ones as the discomfort of the breach dissipates, 3. "errors in perceptual causation" which, among other things, ascribes futility to an individual's power to influence events, and, 4. "the constrained representation of our self" which refers to the self-deceptive capacity to minimize the impact of one's actions so as to evade complicity in ethical breaches.

To describe the impact of "bounded ethicality" generally, and "ethical fading" in particular, using the moral compass metaphor: the compass is deflected radically by the invisible pull of the unconscious, eluding recognition by the conscious mind that erroneously assumes the deflection to be true. Thus, in the face of sensational public breaches of integrity, most people find it easy to condemn the ethical breaches of others while maintaining the self-assurance that they would not commit such breaches.

This paper evaluates popular notions of public integrity against the backdrop of nearly fifty years of research demonstrating the limits of the conscious mind to control self-interest. For instance, the popular notion that integrity is an innate skill must be questioned in view of the "automaticity" of unconscious processes that direct our behavior toward the narrow corridor of self-interest.

Similarly, the conviction that the right thing is easily accessible to persons of moral courage and good character has yielded a popular view of integrity as the boisterous assertion of conviction, rather than the careful weighing of multiple interests. This heroic concept of integrity flies in the face of evidence that people commit small and ongoing breaches of

integrity every day, habituating themselves to a gradual subversion of deliberation and an increasingly automatic capitulation to self-interest. Integrity may be, as is commonly believed, an aspect of strong and sustaining character that good people possess, but practicing it is neither obvious nor easy.

The world of ethical regulation implicitly acknowledges the limits of human conduct without distinguishing between corrupt intent and unconscious submission to self-interest, and mandates the elimination of conflicts of interest. Typically, a conflict is identified, often a financial one, and is prohibited as a matter of law. Temptation is thus theoretically removed so that persons subject to the ethical rule may be focused single-mindedly on their proper duties. These mandates are moral sirens, screeching at us to comply or face legal sanctions.

Integrity, as the term is used in this article, is a broader concept of decision-making where such conflict, or competition among choices, is inherent: for instance, as we will discuss below, where loyalty to an institution competes with the duty of truthfulness to a wider group. It is this complex realm of moral choice in which humans often find themselves, in their personal relationships, in situations at work, and as participants in their communities.

In discussing integrity as distinct from ethics, it is intended to suggest that a method of decision-making is required when there is no code or law, nor regulatory mandate, to eliminate the conflict but where the individual must nonetheless act. In light of the research demonstrating vulnerability to unconscious processes, anyone wishing to act with integrity must subject his or her instincts to the rigor of a disciplined practice that minimizes the biases imposed by such processes. Like the pilot who learns to trust his instruments, even in the face of utterly compelling but conflicting instinctive reactions, flying true in the world of integrity is a matter of trust in the practice.

The first three sections of this paper will set out three common traps of integrity practice; how the unconscious processes described above mislead the decision maker--homemaker and Senator alike--into a false belief in his or her rectitude. Sections IV and V outline the fundamentals of the practice that may minimize these traps: 1. Discernment, the capacity to evade psychological traps through a methodology of deliberation, 2. Accommodation, a process of balancing all deliberatively identified duties, and, 3. Rendition, the effective communication of accommodation strategies. Section VI discusses why a revamped system of training is desirable in universities and businesses to prepare future leaders to practice integrity in the face of complex decisions.

1. THE TRAP OF PERSONAL BELIEFS:

“I’m Right, You’re Wrong and That’s All There Is To It!”

For many, Washington D.C. represents the ultimate breakdown of integrity: a place of vicious bickering and endless stalemates where intransigence passes for principle. Although ethical rules governing financial disclosure and campaign contribution laws constrain certain practices of lawmakers, no code or rule does, nor could, practicably impose a method for subjecting belief to truth testing.

As research has revealed, beliefs are a form of self-interest in which our view of others is arranged to constitute a self-assuring and self-sustaining order in the universe. Beliefs tend to be cast in highly moral terms to buttress certainty in such order. “[V]alues do

not motivate behavior, self-interest does, and if one is called to account for behavior, moral values will be marshaled to justify one's actions." (Watson, 2007, p. 329).

Beliefs, like any other prejudgment, stereotype or psychological exaggeration, can lead to extreme idealizations, as we frequently observe in the theories of the major political parties. For instance, Republicans generally assert that fewer taxes and less government stimulate economic growth and in turn, lower deficits. They advocate these theories as incontrovertible moral values even in the face of recent deficit-expanding tax cuts and the consequences of financial de-regulation (Saulnier, 1995).

For their part, Democrats assert that government intervention can solve every negative outcome of the market, from globalization to greed but ignore the untoward effects of such interventions such as Fannie Mae's contribution to the mortgage crisis or the limited impact of nearly \$800B in stimulus spending in 2009 on job creation, its principle purpose (Dionne, 2010).

Citing "research in heuristic theory", Goodman, & Murray (2007) suggest that such extreme positions serve as "shortcuts which compensate for a lack of knowledge and to manage the overwhelming flow of information." These shortcuts prevent political ideologues and their adherents "from exceeding cognitive capacity" (Goodman, & Murray, 2007, p. 907). These political players do not realize "that they are only accessing a subset of their relevant knowledge." (Kunda, cited in Cain, Lowenstein & Moore, 1990, p. 120).

Yet the way debate is conducted in the halls of Congress is not unlike the way political and social beliefs are expressed in town halls and living rooms throughout the country. Whether the subject is national tax policy or school board prerogatives, the conduct of the Afghan war or the mayor's salary increase, the reality of climate change or the inconvenience of road repairs, emotions run high and often drown out reasoned debate.

Figure 1 (Appendix) shows common examples of beliefs over which politicians, cable show hosts, conspiracy theorists and the rest of us argue in extreme terms that bear little relationship to the wider understanding necessary to effectively address the matter.

This tendency carries into our personal relationships as well. False beliefs are created by imagining slights, creating grudges and confirming prejudices about friends and neighbors: So and so "should have invited us to his party." "The Jones' should be donating more to the United Way. . . or "they should have greeted us more enthusiastically at the local market." "The Smiths never show up on time" or "how could Bob have been so unthinking and inconsiderate." Truth becomes subservient to the compulsion for self-assurance.

The tendency to default into a negative and extreme view of others, on matters from the trivial to those of national significance, seems to reflect, as most beliefs do, the psychological pitfalls of automaticity more than the goals of "controlled processing" (Moore & Lowenstein, 2005). To put it in terms depicted by New Yorker cartoonist, Robert Mankoff: "People are both incredibly smart and invincibly stupid." (Hauser, 2008).

This failing, illuminated by research over the past fifty years, was poignantly portrayed in Scripture nearly two thousand years earlier: "How can you say to your brother, brother, allow me to extract the straw that is in your eye while you yourself are not looking at the rafter in that eye of yours" (Luke, 6:42 (New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures, 1984)). The cost in integrity of this failing is substantial. Without commitment to derive truth from available facts, there is little capacity to act in accordance with a common good, or to maintain discourse on any level other than the idiosyncratic compulsion of psychological automaticity.

II. THE TRAP OF USING GOOD INTENTIONS TO EXCUSE BAD ACTIONS

“Oh No, You Misunderstand. Judge Me by What I Say, Not What I Do.”

In 2004, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia was challenged on ethical grounds for going on a hunting trip with then Vice President Cheney. It wasn't the friendship or the hunting trip that attracted criticism, but the fact that the Supreme Court had three weeks earlier agreed to hear a case in which Vice President Cheney was a party.

When questioned about the apparent conflict of interest, the Justice petulantly responded: “I don't see how my impartiality can reasonably be questioned.” (Liptak, 2004).

To most observers it was quite clear how an intimate friendship refreshed on a hunting trip might compromise Justice Scalia's impartiality but the Justice could not see it. “This incapacity reflects the now well-known tendency to assume proficiency in the detection of conflicts of interest facing others, but not in the situations involving the self.” (Clugh, et. al, 2005, p. 75). By failing to acknowledge the conflict—the deflection of one's moral compass by operation of self-interest—even the noble will of a jurist may falter, leading directly to ethical misjudgments.

Similarly, a physician offered a free vacation by a drug company does not see how his acceptance may influence his drug recommendations to patients (Ramshaw, 2011). Or, a CEO whose bonus is dependent on the company's financial performance cannot acknowledge that this might lead him to skew the accounting criteria to reflect most favorably on him (Krause, 2009).

Figure 2 (Appendix) offers examples of how the conflict of personal interest drives many to guiltlessly engage in common breaches of integrity that they would deplore in others.

No one intends to contribute to financial deception, government corruption, street crime, tax evasion, gossip or lying. Still, many engage in behavior that deepens the ethical crises caused by such conduct without doubting their own integrity.

Perhaps the most poignant example of this failure lies in the thousands of financial professionals—bank lenders, securities dealers, debt insurers and rating agency analysts—who, by their imperceptible individual actions, managed to collectively cripple the world's most powerful economy.

Another example of how the purity of intent obscures us to the reality of our actions is the belief, held by the vast majority of Americans, that they are environmentalists. Yet, when asked to identify a single practice they perform to protect the environment, most are unable to do so (Tenbrunsel, 2005). “Humans tend to be very good at justifying why self-serving behavior is fair and experts can believe that that they are giving objective, sound advice even while they are giving advice that aligns more closely with their incentives than with the truth.” (Clugh, et. al., 2005, p. 80).

One final example makes this point: Is there anyone who has not heard himself or herself say, when confronted with the criticism from even a trusted source: “You misunderstood. I didn't mean that,” as if intent automatically erases the effects of action? “That's different” is a refrain people commonly make to disavow the interpretation that critics rightfully place on their actions.

Good judgment in service of integrity requires more than the forcefulness of even a jurist's conviction in his own integrity, but rather the acknowledgment that one's moral compass is invisibly deflected by self-interest.

III. THE TRAP OF HOLDING SELF-INTEREST AS A DUTY

“I Have to Do That to Survive.”

In the previous sections we discussed how self-interest motivates extreme belief, as well as obscures conflicts of interest. This section will discuss a related manifestation of self-interest: ignoring ethical obligations to others by asserting self-interest as a duty.

Let us look one final time to Washington to illustrate this point. Most of us abhor how campaigns are financed in this country: politicians court big donors and when elected, grant them access in proportion to their donations (Birnbau, 1993). Similarly, in their political campaigns, candidates often resort to negative campaign advertisements that promote lies, exaggerations, slurs, innuendo and ridicule, exactly the opposite of the conduct most people respect in a leader (Krupnikov, 2011).

It is therefore sobering to consider that what politicians do to serve their political objectives mirrors our own actions in serving our economic ones. Figure 3 (Appendix) offers examples of such conduct.

In each of these cases, regular people, decent parents and compassionate friends—law abiding, charity-giving and church-going neighbors—make choices to protect their economic interests in the same way as politicians protect their political interests. And both will invoke the same justification: It's just something they must do to survive.

In the purest sense, the word “survival” refers to what one absolutely must do, and what the law allows one to do, to preserve one's life. Self-preservation is an exemption from otherwise inviolable rules of morality; the prohibition against killing is voidable if killing is done in self-defense (Voloikh, 2007); a prisoner of war compelled to make enemy munitions while interned in an enemy camp may avoid court martial (Joint Service Committee On Military Justice, 2012); stealing bread to feed a hungry family may mitigate criminal penalties (New York State Penal Law, 1979).

It is a stretch, however, to excuse, as a prerogative of survival, the conduct of politicians who grant lobbyists decisive influence on policy to repay them for campaign contributions, or lie about their opponents to win election. It is also a stretch to excuse as a matter of survival, concealment of the truth from those who have a reasonable expectation of it, as the examples in Figure 3 demonstrate.

Americans revere truth telling. One of the most popular affirmations of integrity is “to thine own self be true.” Yet our culture exhibits numerous exemptions to this commonly accepted ethical mandate. Most people permit themselves white lies, they converse in clichés, they endure the transparent exaggeration of car commercials and the canned laughter on a TV sit com; they sustain collective aspiration as Americans with “noble lies” (Plato, Book 3, 414e–15c) that could not be literally true, such as, anyone can get rich in America, and they deploy practical lies to prevent confrontations with thorny social issues, like, don't ask, don't tell. Similarly, in court, if witnesses try to tell the whole truth, as they swear to God they will, they are usually cut off by the lawyers, or the judge who instructs them to just answer the question.

Still, most people are incensed if knowingly lied to when they expected the truth, but often conceal the truth from people who have a right to it as set forth in Figure 3. In so doing, they take for granted that whatever they do, they must do, to survive, even in the absence of any reasonable threat to their self-preservation (Watson, 2007). Rather than surviving, they are colluding in the concealment of truth.²

IV. INTEGRITY'S FIRST STEPS:

Breaking the Automatic Equation of Self-Interest with Duty; Discerning True Duties

The first step in gaining knowledge about the practice of integrity is discernment: identifying duties relevant to ethical decision-making. The process of identifying such duties constitutes the first line of defense against the default engagement of self-interested and automatic impulses. Duty may be defined as a responsibility to fulfill a reasonable expectation of some person or group of persons. For instance: fidelity (to a spouse), patriotism (to a country), confidentiality (to patients and clients), loyalty (to an employer), fiduciary duty (to investors), and so forth. Self-interest, although commonly viewed as an inevitable component of human decision-making is not inherent in the concept of duty. For instance none of the above categories of duties encompasses self-interest. Self interest ineluctably diverts the focus of one's responsibility from what one owes others to how one can promote oneself and thus destroys the core moral component of the concept of duty.

Discernment as a prerequisite to the practice of integrity requires not only the deliberate segregation of self-interest in a rigorous process of identifying the most apparent duties, but also the recognition of all relevant duties. A memorable scene in the film *Saving Private Ryan* illustrates how this process is conducted.

Captain Miller, played by Tom Hanks is charged with the duty of finding Private Ryan, a soldier embedded somewhere in coastal France after the Normandy invasion, and getting him safely behind Allied lines. In the course of this mission, Captain Miller detects an enemy machine gun placement. As Miller contemplates an attack on the position, each member of the platoon objects to the assault, offering variations of the same argument: by bypassing the placement, they avoid unnecessary risk to themselves and to the objective of finding Ryan. Captain Miller finally and emphatically rebuts this limited view of duty by stating: "I thought our objective was to win the war." (Gordon & Spielberg, 1998). But for the discernment of Captain Miller, who perceives and expresses the largest possible view of duty, the group's decision would stall on the level of self-interest expressed as duty.³

² This polarity, "survival vs. collusion", was originated and communicated to the author in a private conversation, by psychiatrist Daniela Gitlin, M.D. to differentiate behavior which serves actual self-preservation from that which merely advances self-interest. (See, generally, Gitlin at www.shrinkunwrapped.com.)

³ An executive friend of the author offered that when confronting decisions of ethical dimension, he brings together the largest possible group with knowledge of the issue to increase the likelihood that the widest perspective of the corporation's duty will be recognized.

V. INTEGRITY'S NEXT STEPS:

Integrity Lies in Accommodating Competing Duties of Equal or Relative Merit, Not Boisterously Proclaiming The Rectitude Of One Over The Other

Like Captain Miller in *Saving Private Ryan*, people who practice integrity understand that integrity often involves not just one duty but several, requiring an accommodation of multiple duties of equal or relative right (Badaracco, 2001; Nash, 1981).

For instance, in the first example of Figure 3, the Wall Street broker is confronted with a conflict between the duty of loyalty to his employer: to sell the stock and sustain the fortunes of the company, and the duty of truthfulness: to accurately advise his clients of the quality of the stocks he sells.⁴

To highlight the competing duties at stake in this scenario, students of the author's classes are asked to play-act an accommodation that serves both duties. The successful students manage to imply the truth to the brokerage clients through hints, humor, body language, fluctuations in intonation, and other means of indirect communication, yet avoid the direct violation of their employer's order.

This concept of integrity—quietly trying to accommodate multiple duties—flies in the face of the popular belief that integrity requires a public and uncompromising commitment to a single duty. Harvard ethicist Joseph Badaracco debunks this common misconception, citing examples of how true heroes of integrity are typically modest, understated and pragmatic (Badaracco, 2001).

By exhibiting such characteristics in *Saving Private Ryan*, Captain Miller displays the critical role of communication in the practice of integrity. He listens to every argument, does not raise his voice and does not put anyone down; there is no smug smile and no foul language. He does not call attention to himself because the matter at stake is not about him nor does he have a vested interest in conquering the will of others. Instead, his “quiet ego” allows him to lead his men to an understanding of their multiple duties without forcefully imposing it (Wayment & Bauer, 2007, p.9).

VI. THE CASE FOR INTEGRITY TRAINING

Not Mere “Ethics” Training

As the examples of Figure 3 reveal, the modern business environment is an ethical obstacle course: overblown mission statements, demanding CEO's, emphasis on short term objectives over long term sustainability, long hours and inordinate physical demands, and intense pressures for a competitive edge.

It is little wonder that for many within this ethical pressure cooker, surviving becomes a professional goal and therefore, by default, the principal source of personal

⁴ Rushford Kidder, Founder and President of The Institute for Global Ethics articulated four basic right vs. right categories: In addition to truth vs. loyalty: individual vs. community, short-term vs. long term and justice vs. mercy (Kidder, 1995).

accomplishment. The resulting tension between the self interest of survival, and adherence to true duties, requires a re-examination of the prevailing method of ethics instruction.

In most college curricula, ethics is taught by a series of case histories. These studies emphasize glaring distinctions between right and wrong. The expectation underlying the case history method is that by shining the light on spectacular ethical failures a student will willfully resolve to refrain from such conduct when he or she enters the business world (Cano & Sams, 2011).

In view of the traps portrayed in this article, such an expectation may be misplaced because right and wrong distinctions are not so clear or consciously acknowledged (Bosco, Melchar, Beauvais, & Desplaces, 2010). Students may be better served if courses simulate common decision-making scenarios. By such repetition, like a pilot's simulation training, students may gradually relinquish beliefs, instincts and false duties in favor of an objective method of managing competing duties.⁵

Another pitfall to the practice of integrity is reliance alone on standard ethics training. Compliance with ethical rules is vastly different from practicing integrity: ethics rules focus on the elimination of conflicts of interest and avoiding sanctions, essentially a disposition to stay out of trouble. Integrity training teaches how to manage complex conflicts of interests, and promotes a culture of duties—not avoidance of sanctions—upon which leadership thrives. As in the student training suggested above, business integrity training places emphasis on defined conventions of decision making, not the unreliable standard of a manager's instinct (Khalid & Collier, 2012).

The question remains whether most people have the capacity to discern duties by constraining their automatic insistence that their beliefs are fool proof, that they have pure intentions, and their capacity for integrity is innate. But the effort must be made. As events overtaking us plainly reveal, without training in the practice of integrity, the quality of our relationships, our economy and our democracy will continue to deteriorate. (DeMoss and Nicholson, 2009).

Those who make the effort, may, by their acts, change the alignment of our stars.

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⁵ The simpler the exercises, to begin with, the better. For example: "You are at a ballgame with your biggest client, and he whispers a question to you during the playing of the national anthem, expecting a response. Do you find a way to respectfully put him off, or respond to him and forfeit your attention to the ceremony taking place on the field."

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APPENDIX

Figure 1

- Government regulations destroy market efficiency
- Deregulation fosters greed and corruption
- Fannie Mae's sponsorship of home ownership caused the mortgage crisis
- Banker speculation caused the mortgage crisis
- Tax increases destroy jobs
- Spending cuts destroy lives
- The rich don't pay their way
- Name one thing the government ever does right
- Bush is stupid; Obama is a socialist
- Flag burning should be unconstitutional
- Flag burning is the best demonstration of freedom.

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Figure 2

- Everyone despises the scourge of insider trading, but how many would decline a reliable stock tip if offered?
- We condemn the “old boy” network as synonymous with political corruption, but who refrains from using influence to get a job for a son or daughter?
- No one we know commits theft but we all know someone who purchased an expensive suit or handbag on a Manhattan street corner at a fraction of the normal price
- Many of us complain about corporate tax evasion even as we cheat on our own taxes.
- No one likes gossip about him or herself but most of us freely gossip about others.
- We hate being lied to but we tell white lies all the time.
- We use our expense accounts more liberally than we would our own money.
- We understand the impact of runaway insurance costs but many of us pad claims or fail to check the costs of covered medical treatments.

Figure 3

- As a stock broker, you comply with your company's order to aggressively sell an inferior stock in which the company has heavily invested (Stempel & Eder, 2010).
- As a manager for an insurance company, you are ordered to achieve cost savings by automatically challenging every new claim for breast cancer treatment (Gershberg & Clarke, 2010).
- As the account manager at an advertising agency for a drug company, you are told to go ahead with an ad campaign for a new drug, despite reports doubting its usefulness for the intended market (Spiegel, 2010).
- As an employee of a mutual fund, you are ordered to dump poor performing stocks on the last day of the quarter and buy better ones to conceal the poor performance of the portfolio during the quarter (Kim, 2009).
- After impasse is reached in discussions over your salary increase, you accept your boss' offer to backdate your stock option agreement to make a deal (Lattman, 2010).
- At a company conference, it is decided that it is more cost-effective to forego product safety adjustments and instead pay damages for customer injuries. You disagree but don't say anything (Werhane, 1999, pp. 71-74).
- You cut corners on an important memo for your boss, leaving work early so you can attend your child's soccer game.
- At a performance review meeting, you fail to truthfully inform a non-performing employee of his or her low prospects for continued employment.
- When you fall behind on your calls, you do not make the effort to email the caller to let them know you are delayed and will get back to them later.